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ABSTRACT  
This paper argues that it is morally irresponsible for modern medical providers or health care 
institutions to support and advocate the integration of CAM practices (i.e. homeopathy, 
acupuncture, energy healing, etc.) with conventional modern medicine. The results of such 
practices are not reliable beyond that of placebo. As a corollary, it is argued that prescribing 
placebos perceived to stand outside the norm of modern medicine is morally inappropriate. Even 
when such treatments do no direct physical harm, they create unnecessary barriers to patients’ 
informed understanding of their health. 
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People from a variety of backgrounds regularly visit acupuncturists, homeopaths, 
naturopaths, and other practitioners of alternatives to science-based medical care. Such 
“complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM), as the name suggests, is understood to be a 
complement to or replacement for science-based medicine. Increasingly, people seek alternative 
medical treatments with the tacit approval or outright recommendation of mainstream health care 
practitioners. According to one 2009 survey, United States citizens spend approximately 3.9 
billion dollars on CAM annually.
1
 In keeping with the widespread and growing use of CAM, the 
United States has a governmental agency called the National Center for Complementary and 
Alternative Medicine (NCCAM), which is an arm of the National Institute of Health (NIH). 
NCCAM was founded in 1991, replacing the Office of Alternative Medicine (OAM). According 
to their website: 
2 
 
The mission of NCCAM is to define, through rigorous scientific investigation, the usefulness and 
safety of complementary and alternative medicine interventions and their roles in improving 




The problem with this statement is closely related to the key problem with CAM itself: 
the statement promises to define the usefulness and safety of CAM, rather than establishing 
whether CAM has any scientific merit in the first place.
i
 I want to look closely at NCCAM’s 
mission statement, here at the outset, because it is paradigmatic of the way CAM is presented 
publically and therefore of the way it is understood. Rather than speak on behalf of CAM 
advocates, I want first to allow them to speak for themselves. Once they do, however, I believe I 
can show that CAM’s goals, like the goals of NCCAM, encourage irresponsible clinical 
recommendations and contribute to the spread of dangerous misinformation among patients and 
the general public. NCCAM aims to “integrate” CAM practices into modern medicine and to do 
so “scientifically.” I will argue that when mainstream health care providers and institutions allow 
or recommend this integration, their complicity represents a serious ethical breach of responsible 
health care practice and education.   
Back for a moment to the NCCAM mission statement referenced above. Is the essential 
goal of evaluating whether CAM actually has any scientific merit implicit to NCCAM’s mission, 
such that I might have first interpreted it uncharitably? Not if the rest of the website is to be 
believed. It continues:  
NCCAM's programs and organization incorporate 3 long-range goals: 
1.Advance the science and practice of symptom management. 
2.Develop effective, practical, personalized strategies for promoting health and well-being. 
3.Enable better evidence-based decision making regarding CAM use and its integration into 
health care and health promotion.  
                                                          
i
 In my discussion of CAM I am limiting myself to practices that are often used as replacements for mainstream 
medical care (E.g. Acupuncture, Homeopathy, Naturopathy, etc.) I am not referring to things like music therapy, 
physical therapy, and art therapy. 
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The first two goals have nothing in particular to do with CAM. Intentionally or not, goals 
(1) and (2) are benign sounding cognitive primers that make the controversial circularity of the 
third goal less apparent. The wording of (3) suggests that NCCAM’s raison d'être is the 
integration of CAM practices into mainstream medicine and not the scientific evaluation of such 
practices.  
Yet here we can already identify the difficulty CAM presents, because if any serious 
evidence for a CAM treatment is presented, it no longer is useful or appropriate to refer to the 
treatment as “CAM” at all. In other words, the reason there are no scientifically based 
complementary and alternative approaches to mainstream medicine is that effective medical 
approaches become part of standard medical care. The constant research, vetting of research, and 
implementation of research in standard medical science is focused on utilizing therapies that 
work, and that work best among possible alternatives, which is to say in a transparently 
evidential and testable way.  
Yet the fact that such a position must be asserted and is regularly met with disbelief, fear, 
and cynicism regarding the scientific authority of standard medicine also points to an element of 
incoherency in NCCAM’s approach. NCCAM and its supporters aim to integrate CAM into 
mainstream medicine (per goal 3). In this aim, the advocates of integration assume that there is 
or can be a meaningful way to integrate CAM treatments into science-based practices (on the 
authority of “rigorous scientific investigation”). At the same time, advocates of such integration 
believe that CAM can remain separate from mainstream science-based practices, and they 
usually imply that a strength of CAM is its independence from the difficulties that face 
mainstream medicine (whether economic interests that threaten to oversell certain forms of 
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treatment or a conservatism in practice that threatens to deny access to certain forms of 
treatment).  
NCCAM and other advocates of the integration of CAM into standard medicine make a 
fundamental error, then, in understanding the nature of standard medical science. Again, a 
“scientific approach to CAM” is literally a contradiction in terms, because insofar as science 
establishes the efficacy of any so-called CAM practice, it is no longer “complimentary” or 
“alternative”; it becomes part of standard care. This is how medical science, like all science 
works, through the examination of evidence. 
In order to make the case that mainstream health care providers and institutions should 
not promote the integration of CAM as part of modern medical practice, and that doing so is 
ethically irresponsible, I will call upon the concept of “moral hazard.” Part II of this article sets a 
theoretical foundation upon the concept of moral hazard by drawing on W.K. Clifford’s Ethics of 
Belief and by articulating the ethical and epistemological issues entailed there. In Part III, I will 
explain the grounds on which the promotion of CAM practices among health care practitioners 
and institutions should be understood as professionally irresponsible and morally culpable. In 
Part IV, I will address some objections I anticipate from defenders of CAM. In the concluding 
Part V, I will offer a set of recommendations for integrating humanistic values into medical 
education—which is, I believe, what most people really hope to find when they settle for the 
traditional narratives of CAM practices.    
II. ETHICS OF BELIEF  
In his Ethics of Belief (1877), mathematician and philosopher W.K. Clifford sets out a 
framework meant to guide the formation of ethically warranted beliefs as contrasted with 
ethically blameworthy beliefs. Clifford offers two illustrations of ethically blameworthy beliefs 
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(i.e. insufficiently supported beliefs).
ii
 The first and more famous example begins with the story 
of a ship owner who rents an unsafe vessel to passengers setting course for the new world. In the 
example given by Clifford, it is made known that the owner has reason to believe that this 
particular ship is unsafe. Nevertheless, for the sake of financial profit and convenience, the ship 
owner talks himself out of any doubts he may have and trusts in “providence” for the ship’s safe 
voyage. The ship is wrecked in stormy seas. All aboard perish and the owner quietly collects the 
insurance money due to him.  
The second example involves practitioners of a reform sect of Christianity who are 
rumored to indoctrinate children into practices the larger community considers to be of a 
particularly heretical nature. In the example, a committee is convened to investigate the 
allegations but fails to do so in a meaningful way, thus essentially condemning the religious sect 
to widespread persecution on the basis of unsubstantiated rumors. Eventually the false nature of 
the allegations is revealed. Consequently, the community comes to view the investigative 
committee as irresponsible and derelict in the performance of their commissioned duties.  
In both of these examples, the locus of moral blameworthiness is easy to identify. To 
complicate things Clifford revises his examples and asks if moral blameworthiness is obviated 
by different outcomes (e.g. the ship makes its way safely across the Atlantic; the religious 
reformists are not persecuted but rather tolerated by the citizens around them). Clifford 
concludes that outcomes are irrelevant. A lack of epistemic warrant independent of outcome 
determines the moral significance of these cases. Clifford reasons from these cases to the 
                                                          
ii
 I am discussing Clifford’s approach in “The Ethics of Belief” for the purposes of this essay. Nevertheless, the idea 
that our epistemological practices are of ethical importance dates as far back as Socrates and can be found in the 
dialogues of Plato, the Meditations of Descartes, and the treatise’ of John Locke to name just a few canonical figures 
from the history of philosophy. 
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conclusion that “it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on 
insufficient evidence.”3  
Clifford bases his maxim on the following premises: (1) Beliefs that we accept set 
cognitive patterns for similar beliefs to take hold. (2) Beliefs that we accept will eventually exert 
an influence directly or indirectly on those we come in contact with in the larger community. 
There is a strong case to be made for both of these assertions. It can be argued that a large part of 
standard educational practice is predicated on the first statement being true, and it is a basic 
pedagogical assumption of logic and critical thinking that good cognitive habits are worth 
developing in order to avoid fallacious cognitive patterns. If a person accepts a fallacious form of 
reasoning in one situation, it is likely that she or he will apply the same pattern of reasoning to 
other situations.  
One’s willingness to accept a lack of evidence disproving claim “X” as supporting 
evidence for claim “X” is part of the cognitive pattern of reasoning known as argumentum ad 
ignorantiam, or an argument from ignorance. For example, I might say that no one has 
convincingly disproved that the lights I’ve seen in the desert sky are alien spacecraft, therefore, 
they are alien spacecraft. And if I accept such reasoning in one case it is likely that I will accept 
such reasoning in similar cases. For instance, if I am prone to accept that an unknown light in the 
sky is an extraterrestrial spacecraft because I cannot disprove such a guess, then I am more likely 
to accept claims that extraterrestrial technology is being hidden by the U.S. Government simply 
because I cannot disprove that claim. Similarly, if one is prone to accept post hoc reasoning (i.e. 
that correlation entails causation) in one situation, then one is more likely to do so in other 
situations. For example, we might picture a couple who have experienced “unexplained 
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infertility” successfully conceiving after undergoing acupuncture treatments for fertility, and 
then fallaciously crediting acupuncture with their successful pregnancy based solely on an 
anecdotal correlation. We might further picture that if this couple’s child later shows signs of 
autism shortly after receiving vaccinations, the couple may similarly and fallaciously infer a 
causal link based on correlation. Yet scientific evidence supporting any causal link is lacking in 
both cases. Indeed, Clifford’s first premise––that beliefs arrived at through fallacious cognitive 
patterns are likely to support the formation of additional beliefs predicated on such patterns––is 




A strong case can be made also for Clifford’s second premise––that our accepted beliefs 
eventually exert an influence on our communities––and I would argue that it is even more 
pressing now than it was in Clifford’s 19th century. The rise of modern social media allows 
people to connect, share ideas, and forge relationships in ways that were nearly impossible to 
imagine at the time of Clifford’s writing. Clifford’s argument is that our beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviors impact those around us in ways that we cannot easily foresee. Clifford maintains that 
our beliefs eventually will spill forth into our actions, or influence the actions of others, in ways 
that are largely out of our control. Clifford insists that it matters not whether a person vows to 
keep beliefs private, because our beliefs will influence our behaviors in ways beyond our 
awareness. And the fact is, whether we choose to defend Clifford’s insights or not, we tacitly 
assume their truth whenever we set out to develop sound pedagogy and research standards in 
logic and science (e.g. the value of the double blinded study). If we reflect upon our experience 
at all, it is difficult to deny the fact that our beliefs have and do influence us and others even 
when we do not intend for them to do so.  
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Based on this chain of probable influence, it is not difficult to make the case that we have 
epistemological and moral responsibilities when it comes to the development of our belief 
systems. Does it follow then, as Clifford argues, that it is always wrong, everywhere, and for 
everyone, to believe something without sufficient evidence? One obvious criticism (though 
perhaps not as devastating as it might first seem) is that Clifford’s principle is subject to his own 
standard of warranted belief. In other words, one might counter Clifford by arguing that there is 
not sufficient evidence for his ethical principle, and thus that Clifford is guilty of his own charge.  
However, Clifford does not merely state his principle; he provides an argument that 
grants sufficient reason for its acceptance. In fact, Clifford does go on to describe the sort of 
beliefs he deems warranted. They are beliefs supported by our experience and vetted through 
critical examination. Such standards of warranted belief are consistent with those we accept in 
modern scientific and academic inquiry. Beliefs backed by scientific evidence, well-reasoned 
inference, and open scrutiny are justified beliefs. Beliefs that lack such backing are unjustified 
and, according to Clifford, morally irresponsible.
iii
  
I maintain that there is good reason to accept the moral implications if belief formation, 
though it is not necessary to follow Clifford in the entirety of his categorical condemnation. One 
problem with Clifford’s categorical claim is that some beliefs fall outside the category of beliefs 
subject to verification.
iv
 Matters of aesthetic preference are not open to the sort of scrutiny that 
Clifford’s moral epistemology requires. Can one seriously make the claim that settling one’s 
belief on whether Bach or Beethoven is the superior composer is of moral importance? This 
                                                          
iii
 I have made a similar argument with regard to the politically motivated denial of anthropogenic global warming. 
See Torcello (2011). 
iv
 I am not claiming that Clifford is a verificationist. It simply is the case that certain beliefs are not easily justified 




question can only be answered reasonably in the negative. Furthermore, even if we take 
Clifford’s own examples utterly seriously as templates, we are still left not knowing whether it is 
the belief that is immoral, or the failure to act with due diligence, independent of belief, that is 
morally problematic. 
Let us go back to Clifford’s first example of the ship owner. If the ship owner 
erroneously believed that the vessel was seaworthy, but nevertheless had the ship inspected as a 
standard safety precaution, is it still reasonable to say that his belief in the ship’s seaworthiness is 
immoral? It seems to make more sense to say the owner’s failure to act responsibly, regardless of 
belief, led to a tragic loss of life. Clifford might counter that it is the belief in the ship’s safety 
that spills over into the owner’s actions, or in this case inaction, and thus creates the moral 
culpability. Clifford is right to assert that our beliefs are likely to spill over into our actions. But I 
do not hold the view that we are powerless to guard against such a tendency. The methodological 
project of modern science, aware of the dangers of subjective preconceptions, is aimed at 
guarding researchers from their own confirmation bias. Saying that holding an unwarranted 
belief makes someone immoral is awkwardly close to a doctrine of “thought crime.” How then 
should Clifford’s insights most reasonably be applied? 
Moral Hazard 
The concept of moral hazard is widely used in economics to characterize a situation in 
which the acting agent is insulated from risks placed on others through her actions.  A modest 
conclusion to draw from Clifford’s ethics of belief is that our beliefs carry a moral hazard. This 
means that our beliefs have the potential to spill over into our actions, or to influence the actions 
of others, in a way that places them at risk of undue harms. If our beliefs, given their moral 
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hazard, lead to harmful actions or omissions, then we are morally culpable for the consequences. 
This application of moral hazard condemns the ship owner’s failure to guarantee the 
seaworthiness of his vessel as a matter of procedure, regardless of belief. It is the lack of due 
diligence, and not the privately held belief, that is immoral, but it is the unwarranted belief that 
creates the occasion for such morally fraught neglect. I submit that the moral hazard of belief is 
amplified in this case since the ship’s owner is positioned to assert influence over both the safety 
and the beliefs of his passengers in ways unavailable to others.  
To accept this adapted version of the ethics of belief is to endorse the view that the 
formation of our beliefs involves a burden of moral responsibility. Consequently, while we 
cannot escape the moral responsibility we bear for our unjustified beliefs, we do not necessarily 
carry moral culpability for them. It is important to recognize the difference between moral 
hazard (responsibility) and moral guilt. The former is ubiquitous in a way that the latter is not. 
Moral hazard results from the constant responsibility we have regarding the epistemic quality of 
our beliefs. It is the particular acts or omissions based on our morally hazardous beliefs that are 
potentially morally blameworthy.  
III. SCIENCE, PROFESSIONAL INFLUENCE, AND ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY 
I have argued elsewhere that the moral hazard associated with our beliefs is enough to 
support and recommend an accompanying ethics of public inquiry that extends to all citizens 
insofar as they are bound together as a political body.
5
 Consistent with that claim I have argued 
that the denial of established scientific consensus is best described as “pseudoskeptical,” and that 
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pseudoskeptical claims asserted in the public sphere are morally condemnable.
v
 Such claims are 
morally condemnable within the framework of moral hazard I have outlined above. This is 
especially the case when scientific consensus is relevant to public policy (e.g. the scientific 
consensus on anthropogenic global warming). In particular, pseudoskeptical claims are 
blameworthy when asserted in the public sphere by those with greater influence than the average 
citizen. As an example, if someone with access to the public sphere, such as a politically 
influential public figure, believes that standard vaccinations pose a serious health risk, this belief 
should be categorized as a morally hazardous pseudoskeptical belief. If the public figure defends 
this view in the public domain, without acknowledging the contrary scientific consensus, then 
such speech is morally blameworthy and ought to be strongly condemned as unethical.
vi
 This is 
because the ill-informed and unwarranted opinion of the public figure on this matter is of greater 
than normal public influence. A moral onus is on public officials to speak responsibly on matters 
relevant to public policy. Furthermore, given the ample availability of accurate information in 
the public sphere, and the increased access that politicians have to experts, there is no excuse for 
being ignorant of established scientific consensus. The same can be said of any other public 




                                                          
v
 The process of science involves the application of methodological skepticism. Indeed the one characteristic that all 
scientific fields share is the use of rigorous skepticism in an attempt to disprove a favored hypothesis and guard 
against confirmation bias. Because of this a conclusion that has become part of established scientific consensus is 
grounded in the inherently skeptical process of scientific inquiry. When such claims are called into doubt without 
recognizing the scientific consensus it is more a function of ideology, or cynicism, than skepticism. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to call such doubts (examples of science denialism) pseudoskeptical. 
vi
 Examples of politically affiliated public figures who have behaved immorally with regard to the public 
dissemination of medical misinformation (according to my argument) are Michelle Bachmann and Robert Kennedy. 
In a 2011 Republican Primary debate, and afterword, Representative Michelle Bachmann made unfounded 




A similar situation applies to health care professionals or institutions that recommend 
CAM treatments to patients and the public. Such treatments are scientifically unsubstantiated, or 
at best highly controversial. Indeed, public figures who make pseudoskeptical claims, if 
confronted, are sometimes forced to qualify their statements by admitting they are not actual 
physicians or scientists.
7
 This occurrence calls attention to the fact that actual scientists and 
physicians hold a high level of credibility in the eyes of the public. The recommendation of 
scientifically unsubstantiated procedures is a serious lapse of professional ethics among 
healthcare providers by virtue of their reasonably presumed medical expertise.  
Regarding unsubstantiated medical procedures the default position of the healthcare 
practitioner ought to be that they are clinically unwarranted.
vii
 A null hypothesis is assumed in 
science that places the burden of proof on those promoting a novel treatment to provide 
sufficient evidence of the treatment’s effectiveness. If such evidence is not available, inclusion in 
the clinical scheme of modern medicine is unwarranted. When mainstream health care 
practitioners or medical institutions endorse CAM treatments it violates the reasonable 
expectation that one will not be subjected to, or recommended, treatments unsupported by 
medical science. The endorsement may be as mild as a physician pointing out that some patients 
have reported “positive results from acupuncture.” Even if the physician does not believe that 
such a practice will be effective, she may reason that such practices are unlikely to harm a person 
and may even have a placebo benefit.
8
 However, insofar as this suggestion misleads a patient 
into thinking that there is scientific merit to CAM practices, it interferes with the patient’s ability 
to make informed decisions regarding their health care.
9
 It may also, consistent with the 
                                                          
vii
   One exception to this rule is under circumstances of research when a patient consents, within the bounds of 
informed consent, to undergo an experimental treatment. This is not an exception that can be applied to most 
instances of CAMs integration into mainstream healthcare practices 
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Cliffordian argument made above, spill over into other aspects of the patient’s life—including an 
influence on others.  
Given the preceding arguments it is reasonable to treat our beliefs as holding a moral 
hazard insofar as they have the potential to influence others in disastrous ways. When consulting 
with their patients physicians have a greater than normal responsibility due to their position of 
authority and influence on a patient’s health care beliefs. Therefore, treating physicians ought to 
observe and act according to the following argument. 
1. CAM Treatments are (at best) scientifically controversial 
2. The recommendation of a scientifically controversial treatment is normally unwarranted. 
3. Unwarranted medical advice is morally hazardous. 
4. A morally hazardous recommendation, on the part of a health care practitioner, ought to have 
a strong reasonable justification.  
5. The weak nature of evidence in support of CAM renders strong reasonable justifications 
impossible.   
Conclusion: It is inappropriate, and morally condemnable, to recommend CAM practices to 
patients.  
 
As I have stated above, CAM treatments are at best controversial; it may be just as well 
to call them unwarranted. One of the mistakes that both laypeople and physicians may make is 
thinking that a CAM practice must be disproven before it can be disregarded. This is not the case 
for two reasons: (1) A burden of evidence falls upon CAM practitioners to justify their claims, 
and not on the scientific community to refute their claims. (2) One cannot prove a negative; for 
this reason waiting for any treatment to be conclusively disproven before it is abandoned can 
only be predicated on a fallacious appeal to ignorance. Overlooking this reality may lead some 
medical practitioners and CAM practitioners alike to assume that more research is needed. It is 
not practical however, or necessary, to continue to research claims that have a long track record 
of failing to produce conclusive evidence. It is enough to recognize that CAM is controversial in 
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order to justify its dismissal as a recommendation to patients, and the lack of evidence for CAM 
suggests that it is more strongly condemnable as unwarranted.  
It bears saying that it is morally irresponsible to give dubious medical advice to a patient. 
As such, it is never appropriate for a health care practitioner, or medical institution, to 
recommend or tacitly endorse CAM practices to patients.
viii
 Indeed, it is a morally blameworthy 
breach of trust when providers and institutions overtly or implicitly recommend controversial 
practices to unsuspecting patients and to the general public.
10
   
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
A. CAM is Scientifically Justifiable 
An obvious objection is that CAM, or at least some forms of CAM, are scientifically 
defendable. This claim is made in error. It may be the case that a small minority of individual 
studies can be found that seem to support the use of a particular CAM treatment. However, a 
closer examination of these studies will almost always suggest that there is no greater benefit 
than one could expect from a placebo. Additionally, most such studies are found in journals that 
overtly endorse the integration of CAM into mainstream health practices. Not all “peer-review” 
is equally unbiased or equally blinded. But even if we can uncover in mainstream journals a few 
studies that report the marginal effectiveness of a CAM beyond placebo published, the scientific 
                                                          
viii
 Johns Hopkins provides a good example of an offending institution. On the website for Johns Hopkins Center for 
Integrative Medicine one can read descriptions of treatments remarkably out of step with the modern medical 
science, with which one reasonably presumes their medical students are otherwise exposed. For example, a sample 
passage describing the acupuncture services available at the center reads: “Acupuncture is an ancient form of 
Chinese medicine dating back over 5,000 years. It is based on the concept that the body has specific channels 
(meridians) through which energy (chi) flows. While this energy, or chi, is flowing smoothly, there will be no 
specific pain or disease, but if the chi is either deficient or excess in quantity, or is not flowing freely, there will be 
disease. When acupuncture needles are placed in specific points on the skin, energy is redirected to bring about a 
healing response.” See Johns Hopkins, Integrative Medicine and Digestive Center, Acupuncture.   
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reality is that a significant number of replication studies are necessary to draw any lasting 
scientific conclusions, and here CAM inevitably nosedives. Without successful replication 
studies, a smattering of positive CAM results look like no more than a quirk of flawed analysis 
or methodology. Because again, if a CAM practice does start to look effective in repeated 
testing, then it becomes warranted scientifically just as it stops being a CAM practice—instead 
of CAM, it becomes a straightforwardly science-based medical practice.
ix
 
B. CAM Justified as Placebo 
Some claim that CAM is warranted as a placebo. The idea is that CAM practices are 
unlikely to do any harm, even if they only work as placebos. Debates about the placebo effect 
and whether it is ethical for health care practitioners to use the placebo effect on their patients 
goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, even if we assume that the use of placebo can in 
some cases be justified, it does not follow that every type of placebo is justified. This paper has 
argued that CAM practices are harmful in that they contribute to patient confusion regarding the 
nature of medicine and practice of maintaining or assessing health. Belief in the effectiveness of 
CAM practices can undermine patient compliance with science based conventional therapies. 
Recommendations from a physician tend to carry authority, so the recommendation of CAM, 
even as a placebo, is potentially more harmful than helpful to a patient. If placebos are to be 
used, then their use ought to be restricted to placebos that are not perceived as outside of 
modern medicine. Such a precaution minimizes the risk of misinformation with regard to a 
patient’s health and the nature of modern medicine. The limited effects a placebo may bring 
                                                          
ix
 One might retort that the vast majority of studies published in medical journals never get replicated. This may be 
true and may even point to a separate problem regarding the sort of things that are emphasized in modern medical 
research and scientific publication. This problem is beyond the scope of the current paper. Nevertheless, the issue is 
irrelevant as to whether or not there actually is in current existence a meaningful body of evidence to support the 
integration of various CAM practices into modern medical practice. 
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about are insignificant against the long term harms that inaccurate medical information and the 
resulting embrace of ineffective treatments may cause patients. For this reason it is worth 
emphasizing: if placebos are to be used at all they must not be placebos that lead to patient 
misinformation regarding the nature of modern medicine.    
C. The Argument Presented is Overly Paternalistic 
It might be claimed that the abolitionist position argued for in this paper is overly 
paternalistic and undermines patient autonomy. This charge does not follow. Patients are free to 
seek out whatever alternative forms of treatment they wish, but my argument is that they should 
not be doing so with the impression that it is sanctioned by their health care provider or 
mainstream health care institutions. Furthermore, insofar as CAM practices mislead patients with 
or without the presumed consent of a conventional health care provider or institution, they 
undermine patient autonomy. This is because true patient autonomy requires capacity and 
competence with regard to informed consent. Medical misinformation serves to undermine 
competent decision making and therefore is not reasonably conducive to patient autonomy. The 
importance of informed consent cannot be overemphasized as an important concept in medical 
ethics. One might plausibly assert that one goal of health care treatment in general is to restore a 
patient to as much functional autonomy consistent with a reasonable quality of life as can be 
achieved. Clear and reliable health care information and a realistic understanding of one’s 
condition are essential to these goals. To the degree that advocacy of CAM creates 
misinformation among patients it undermines patient autonomy.  
V. CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS  
17 
 
It is morally irresponsible for modern medical providers or health care institutions to 
support and advocate the integration of CAM practices with conventional modern medicine. 
When asked about CAM practices such as homeopathy, acupuncture, energy healing, 
naturopathy, etc., health care providers should be clear with their patients about the lack of 
supporting scientific evidence for CAM practices, and about what such a lack of evidence means 
(i.e., that it doesn’t necessarily mean testing hasn’t occurred at all). Such practices are 
inappropriate as elaborate placebos for reasons already stated. It bears repeating: placebos should 
not be used if they are perceived by patients to somehow stand outside the norm of modern 
medicine. Health care practitioners have no good reason for complicity.  
One of the things that plausibly attract patients to CAM practitioners is the emphasis such 
practitioners traditionally place on personal care and interaction with clients. A given CAM 
treatment may involve a significant amount of time spent in soothing empathic conversation, soft 
music, pleasant scents, physical touch, and encouragement. Given the lack of evidence for CAM, 
it stands to reason that the personal attention and time that CAM practitioners give to their clients 
is the key trigger for any placebo effects experienced.  
Happily, human empathy and a good patient-physician relationship are not dependent on 
CAM practices. Care of the whole individual and recognition of a patient’s humanity is perfectly 
compatible with the goals of modern medicine. The value of humanistic patient care is often 
lauded by modern medical institutions and practitioners. Unfortunately it does not always go 
beyond rhetorical endorsements. Providing CAM exposure to medical students is no substitute 
for a program of medical humanities that integrates philosophical ethics, literature, art, history, 
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and the social sciences into medical education.
x
 In order to actually foster the sort of 
psychological and emotional benefits that many patients desire in their health care experience, 
medical institutions should more robustly support the integration of humanities in health care 
education and practice. Such efforts can help to correct deficiencies in a modern medical system 
that often provides little time for personalized interaction between healthcare practitioners and 
their patients. Doing so will be far more beneficial to medical practitioners, medical education, 













                                                          
x
 Many institutions do support programs in the medical humanities and they should be commended for doing so. 
Unfortunately some of these same schools also support CAM integration. It should be clear from this article that 
CAM integration deserves no support as part of the legitimate integration of the humanities in health care. 
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